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KRISZTINA KARSAI* 
 
European Criminal Policy
**
 
 
 
 
I. Criminal Policy – Introduction and Definition 
 
Today, no one stands to argue that European criminal law exists, and as such, it is obvious 
that European criminal policy exists as well.1 Traditionally and within the internal 
framework of states, criminal policy is legal regulation forming ideology stemming from 
social attitudes and value systems of a society, which is the basis for and at the same time, 
justification of the formation of criminal law and criminal justice. In many cases, it 
formulates some favourable social aim and tries to achieve it through legal regulation. 
However, it is also true that often times criminal policy changes occur for general political 
support (=to gain votes), taking advantage of the sensitivity of the masses concerning 
punishability, punishments, sense of justice, and of course fear. 
Criminal policy is one of the tools for social control of crime,2 therefore, it should be 
viewed as an activity of the state that reacts to this social phenomenon. Jescheck also 
highlights that criminal policy is about how criminal law can be developed most 
preferably in such a way in the interest of it being able to fulfil its main task – the 
protection of society. 3 Garland names two main strategies, on one hand hereby 
identifying the tools that make criminality tolerable (e.g. decriminalization), and on the 
other hand, those tools that aim to suppress criminal activity (e.g. crime prevention.4 
These can be further specified as Aromaa defined under four points: “the objectives of 
criminal policy are defined being fourfold: 1) to minimise the social costs of crime; 2) to 
minimise the costs of crime control; 3) to distribute these costs; and 4) to do this in a fair 
manner. “5  
                                                           
*  intézetvezető egyetemi tanár,SZTE ÁJTK Bünűgyi Tudományok Intézete 
**  This research was supported by the project nr. EFOP-3.6.2-16-2017-00007, titled “Aspects on the development of 
intelligent, sustainable and inclusive society: social, technological, innovation networks in employment and digital 
economy”. The project has been supported by the European Union, co-financed by the European Social Fund and 
the budget of Hungary. 
1  Criminal policy and penal policy were discussed separately in criminology before, by understanding the latter in 
the context of penal execution, but in this paper, I do not follow this distinction.  
2  M. ANCEL: Social Defence. Psychology Press. 1998. See more basic literature: H. D. BARLOW, S. H. DECKER, 
Criminology and Public Policy: Putting Theory to Work. Temple University Press, 2010.  
3  H-H. JESCHECK, T. WEIGEND: Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil. Duncker & Humblot. Berlin, 1996.  
4  D. GARLAND: The limits of the sovereign state – Strategies of crime control in contemporary society. In: British 
Journal of Criminology. 1996. p. 445 et seq. 
5  K. AROMAA: Responsible criminal policy / Crime and criminal policy. In: Kriminologijos Studijos. 2014. p. 77. 
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All criminal policy traditionally stems from some underlying philosophical ideology, 
and as such, is either linked to or assigned to political ideas. That is, although it reacts to 
the same real-life phenomenon, liberal and conservative criminal policy provides 
radically different answers. At the same time, Korinek highlights that “the general 
political motivation is expanded with a new, unique element, which is independent of 
the aspiration for power, a role influenced to a great degree by the opportunities and 
methods.”6 
Kerezsi provides an outstanding summary when stating that taking into consideration 
international (and domestic) trends, criminal policy is characterised by the conjunction of 
the following: crime has become a determinative political issue; the interpretation of 
behaviour that can be defined as crime is increasingly broader, that is, specifically 
defining crime is increasingly becoming solely political and not a professional question 
and the technology employed in the system to suppress crime, as well as discourse 
concerning crime, and the metaphorical speeches about crime and criminal justice have in 
all regards become spectacular and visible, thereby providing excellent opportunity for 
them to be notice: the government governs.7 
 
 
 
II. European Criminal Policy  
 
 
1. Definition and Content 
 
My opinion is that in European Union terms we should be using the term criminal policy, 
actually it is necessary, but it can only be meaningfully grasped by taking the following 
into consideration.8 
Criminal policy, considered the tool of state crime control most certainly cannot be 
applied to the European Union arena without some restrictions. It does however suffice as 
a starting point, and therefore it can be stated EU criminal policy has become a tool for 
controlling crime, namely through the fact that its carrier and representative is such an 
entity that is capable of influencing criminal law and legal regulation concerning criminal 
justice at both member state level and in a narrower sense “supranationally” (European 
Public Prosecutor, EPPO, as well as establishing legislation at the level of legal decrees).  
Considering that currently there is no independent, separate EU criminal justice in 
terms of a branch of law and justice system, the member states’ criminal justice system are 
                                                           
6  L. KORINEK: Kriminológia [Criminology]. Volume I. Magyar Közlöny és Lapkiadó. 2010. p. 520 
7  K. KEREZSI: Kriminálpolitika egykor és ma. [Criminal policy once upon a time and nowadays] K. Karsai (ed): 
Essays for Honour of Ferenc Nagy. 2018. Szeged, p. 551. 
8  See further basic literature: S. MANACORDA: Public Policy and the Court of Justice: The „Combinatorical logic” 
in the framework of criminal law. In: New Journal of European Criminal Law. 2010. pp. 59–83. A. H. GIBBS: 
Reasoned Balance in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In: European Law Journal. 2011. pp. 121–
137. J. B. BANACH-GUTIERREZ, CH. HARDING (EDS): EU Criminal Law and Policy. Values, Principles and 
Methods. 2016. J. OUWERKERK, J. ALTENA, J. ÖBERG, S. MIETTINEN (EDS.): The Future of EU Criminal Justice 
Policy and Practice. Legal and Criminological Perspectives. Brill. 2019. S. PEERS: EU Justice and Home Affairs 
Law. Volume II: EU Criminal Law. Policing and Civil Law. 4th ed. 2016. pp. 174–183. 
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those that continue to directly affect crime and criminal procedures. National criminal law 
regulations therefore function as a well perceivable “buffer” that filters and transforms EU 
criminal policy “fruits”, prior to their entry into the domestic legal order. Because of this 
buffering effect EU criminal policy has developed a fundamentally important 
characteristic: because its mode of action cannot prevail directly under crime control, the 
aspects that literally politicize national criminal policy (collecting votes, symbolic 
functions) are of no importance here. Because of this, its directions can be determined 
based on grounded scientific results, evidence-based research9, and real criminal 
problems. For the EU legislator, gaining power cannot be interpreted through tools of 
criminal policy; this cannot be achieved through legislative procedures nor through 
general mechanisms of exercising EU-level power – therefore, there is no such endeavour.  
Therefore, EU criminal policy could just be a professional question, even if the moral 
panics sweating up member states pacify to simple opinions through the course of 
developing EU criminal policy.10 One rather important consequence in the twenty-five 
year development of European criminal law is that already behind the many new legal 
institutions are scientific concepts and results, but even the essence of these are not lost 
during the political decision-making processes. (see below).  
Today there is no doubt concerning the concept of European criminal law: this branch 
of European law contains every legal norm issued on the legal basis of the third pillar and 
of its successor, the policy of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). European 
criminal law (ECL) has its counterparts in several domestic criminal laws, which 
constantly deal with accommodating the impact and developments brought about by 
European movement (in the form of ‘harmonised criminal law’). The conception of a 
definition for this new legal terrain faced initial difficulties due to uncertainty of the 
Member States (MS) and the political implications of the question of whether the way 
they try to follow is the proper and suitable one.  
Due to terminological correctness, it is necessary to underline that the very specific 
term ‘union’s policy’ on the AFSJ (in shared competence) means only the activities of the 
EU entitled by Articles 67-89 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) 
for. But this activity – from the point of view of the establishment of European criminal 
policy, constitutes only one of the elements of European criminal policy, namely that of 
influencing national criminal law systems (and national criminal justice). The other not 
less important element of European criminal policy flows from the goal to protect jointly 
and supranationally the financial interests of the EU, if necessary, through criminal law 
(Article 325 TFEU). 
Since in a broader sense, European criminal law has three different goals taking from 
the text of TFEU, European criminal policy covers this triangle of aims, they are as 
follows: the protection of separated interests represented by the EU (mainly and recently 
financial interests); the aim of effective joint crime control (in the MS) and the sanctioning 
of violations of EU law.  
                                                           
9  W. DE BONDT, Evidence Based EU Criminal Policy Making: In Search of Matching Data in European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research. 2014. pp. 23–49. 
10  K. KEREZSI: Kriminálpolitika egykor és ma. [Criminal policy once upon a time and nowadays]. cit. p. 548. 
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It is important to underline a significant element in this development: the role of the 
scientific ideas and the criminal law schools in this field is essential. Many ideas11 that 
emerged later as legal norms were born in the ‘Petri dishes’ of criminal law professors in 
Paris, London, Rome, Berlin, Luxemburg and Brussels (etc.). The real impact of academic 
concepts on politics in Europe is most traceable in this domain. Professors of law have 
real opportunities to develop new ideas and try justifying new models because European 
politicians and Eurocrats need as many alternatives as possible for building the future and 
to be able to choose the ‘best’ one after due deliberation. Of course the ‘best’ solution is 
the one that fits directly into the actual political picture, but if the basic concepts are 
elaborated upon by academics, the professional control upon these ideas could be more 
effective and the legislative will make use of this academic origin and enhance 
consultation with the ‘parents’ as they try to find a legal form that does not destroy the 
original idea itself. Even for the MS, it is easier to accept a new idea if there is broad 
(Europe-wide) consent on the academic level. However, there is another factor that has 
strengthened and continues to strengthen the position of legal academia in this domain. The 
Commission itself subsidises many transnational academic research projects12 in the field 
of criminal law and criminal justice, and the calls for proposal of the Commission to lay out 
the general problems in need of global academic concepts to resolve them. High-level 
academic work and networking through Europe is induced by granting funding for these 
projects in the special fields of criminal law; and networking enables professionals to think 
together in a broader context and on a wide horizon concerning the future of ECL. All these 
stakeholders of the academic world are actors of the European criminal policy as well. 
 
 
2. Actors of European Criminal Policy 
 
The bearer of European criminal policy is the Committee, the parliament, or even the 
Council alone. With regards to content, we are talking about criminal policy activity when 
these actors take part in legislation of criminal law that has an effect on member states in 
the scope of fighting crime transnationally through joint effort with regard to substantive 
law and procedural law. It is important to establish that the other component of European 
criminal policy shall be interpreted separately from this (but also in parallel), which is in 
the scope of laying down the protection of sui generis EU criminal law interests.  
The activity of the Court to develop law, in my opinion, cannot be considered criminal 
policy, because its aim is not to control crime (or its some intermediate goal of that, see 
above Aaroma), but rather to provide for the adequate and uniform functioning of EU law, 
as well as uniform interpretation of law, clarification of questions of jurisdiction, to make 
                                                           
11  CORPUS JURIS introducing provisions for the purpose of the financial interests of the European Union, under the 
direction of MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY (1997); THE MANIFESTO ON EUROPEAN CRIMINAL POLICY (2009) See 
below.  
12  After the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force the Commission published its first agenda for the development 
of JHA (Tampere Program, 1999), which was a „high-profile multiyear program offering political direction” 
(Peers, 274) and which was a legal basis for projects financed by the Commission. The Hague Program (2004–
2009), the Stockholm Program (2009–2014) of the Commission serves the same goals and seems to function very 
effectively. 
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decisions concerning legal debates based on EU law (not criminal claims!), and the 
elimination of legal acts that violate EU law.  
 
 
3. Birth of European Criminal Policy  
 
It can be raised as a further relevant question: from what point are we speaking of 
European criminal policy? In the European discourse, step in the development of 
European criminal law could not have been regarded as ideology developed beforehand or 
the step by step realization of priorities, because no master plan had existed, and thus the 
development of European criminal law did not qualify a uniform policy in the EU scope.   
Meanwhile clear criminal law contents appeared already in EU law as a result of 
legislation from the former third pillar (Judicial and Home Affairs), those were not 
identified as part of a ‘criminal policy’ – the concept of European criminal policy was 
born with the AFSJ provided by the TFEU after Lisbon (since 2009). Some steps were 
taken by the Commission by issuing the so-called green papers that addressed specific 
legislative issues of criminal justice13 and this activity can be identified as the early 
emergence of fragments of a criminal policy, but these steps did not build a 
comprehensive policy because of the lack of a ‘masterplan’ and the general entitlement for 
creating sui generis criminal law on an EU level. The multi-annual programmes 
(Tampere, Haag, Stockholm) of the European Council had similar effects as well, they 
establish general and political goals in the area of Justice and Home Affairs of the third 
pillar without calling them pieces of criminal policy.  
The “Manifesto on European Criminal Policy”14 signalled the need for a 
comprehensive ‘policy’ on European criminal law legislation in 2009 and addressed core 
issues of criminal justice which belongs to the regulatory field of EU legislation in shared 
competence. Although this memorandum was a project of non-actors of policy fields 
(academia), its function as forerunner and warm-up-initiative should not be 
underestimated. A bit later, in 2011, the Commission published its communication entitled 
“Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies 
through criminal law”.15 According to the preamble “this Communication aims to present 
a framework for the further development of an EU Criminal Policy under the Lisbon 
Treaty. The EU now has an explicit legal basis for the adoption of criminal law directives 
                                                           
13  For instance, Green Paper on Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in Criminal Proceedings 
throughout the European Union. Brussels, 19.2.2003. COM(2003) 75; Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdiction 
and the Principle of ne bis in idem in Criminal Proceedings. Brussels, 23.12.2005. COM(2005) 696; Green Paper 
on the Presumption of Innocence. Brussels, 26.4.2006. COM (2006) 174; Green Paper on Obtaining Evidence in 
Criminal Matters from one Member State to Another and Securing its Admissibility. Brussels, 11.11.2009. 
COM(2009) 624.  
14  In December 2009 the “European Criminal Policy Initiative”, an international research group consisting of 14 
university professors from ten Member States of the European Union published the so called “Manifesto on 
European Criminal Policy” in the German Online-Journal “Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik” 
(www.zis-online.com) in seven languages. The principles and guidelines for a reasonable criminal policy on the 
European level established therein have attracted great interest throughout the European Union. See 
www.crimpol.eu 
15  COM(2011) 573; Brussels, 20.9.2011. 
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to ensure the effective implementation of EU policies which have been subject to 
harmonisation measures. An EU Criminal Policy should have as overall goal to foster 
citizens' confidence in the fact that they live in a Europe of freedom, security and justice, 
that EU law protecting their interests is fully implemented and enforced and that at the 
same time the EU will act in full respect of subsidiarity and proportionality and other basic 
Treaty principles.” The endeavour to be a tool of crime control appears in this agenda in 
connection with the EU policies.  
 
 
 
III. European Criminal Policy in Actio 
 
The need for joint action to combat crime as part of European integration, essentially and 
in a legally relevant way, appeared in the ’90s, more precisely with the creation of the EU 
(1993), when the MS determined the so-called matters of common interests. The last 
twenty-five years’ history in European criminal law demonstrate dynamic development 
that started by labelling ‘traditional forms’ of mutual cooperation in criminal matters as 
‘European’ ones, then went on to elaborate new – singular and independent – forms of 
cooperation. Simultaneously, a new philosophy of cooperation was born and became 
stronger in the field of criminal law, which is generally followed in present legislation and 
applying the law.  
In the past twenty-five years, there has been a significant development of law in this 
field as well, including, in general, the following: it is a key question to the MS, how 
much of their punitive power derives from sovereignty and how exactly will they transfer 
to the organization they established for the sake of progress, with particular attention to 
the fact that in many cases, combating transnational crime is more effective and more 
successful at the EU level. The protection of sovereignty is guarded by the balancing 
system of mutual guarantees and principles, which not only sets up a framework, but also 
excludes effective cooperation in urgent cases, or when the case concerns more than two 
states. However, in Europe and in the European Union, the development of law is going 
through a fundamental change of approach regarding the system of rules in criminal 
cooperation. Even though community integration, originally did not extend to criminal 
cooperation, the European Union established by the Maastricht Treaty opened room for it 
as well, and it could be said that the EU MS tightened the web of EU legal protocols in the 
field of criminal cooperation.  
As a general characteristic of the relevant regulation it may be mentioned that the 
conventions and treaties concluded by the MS, on the one hand, reflect and reinforce the 
former agreements – mostly adopted under the aegis of the Council of Europe –, but on 
the other hand, operating with such novel and hitherto desirable tools, which truly show 
the commitment of the states to develop a more effective criminal cooperation, and its 
introduction is verified by the slowly ubiquitous European integration. 
For these reasons, the development basically proceeds with baby steps. It has two 
directions: political consensus precedes legal changes, which are then reflected in some 
legislative act being enacted, the execution of which will strengthen the change. The other 
way of development is when change becomes a necessary consequence, as a result of the 
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existing legal situation, primarily due to the activity of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and the courts of the MS. The landmark decisions of the courts indicate 
the path of this development, but these innovations and changes only apply to a small 
section of law (to a specific type of case, to a specific legal institution). As an example, the 
earlier battle of the Council and the Commission may be mentioned on whether EU law 
regarding crimes damaging the environment should be issued by so-called directive or 
framework decision. The problem is easy to understand without a detailed explanation: 
considering that the EU policy on environmental protection is an EU competence, the 
question was, whether this power includes criminal law as a means of protection and the 
establishment of its frames at the EU level. Not a political consensus was necessary here, 
but the interpretation of one provision of the EU Founding Treaty, which was done by the 
Court of Justice by declaring that in the interest of implementing EU policy, criminal law 
as a regulatory system is applicable, such regulation does not behave differently.16   
In the establishment of the legal framework evolving along the above two lines, we 
may see the following substantial key points: 
–  facilitating and legalizing criminal cooperation between the MS (legal assistance 
type of cooperation and police cooperation as well), 
–  working on achieving the joint European justice region (e.g. development concerning 
jurisdictional conflicts, prohibition of double jeopardy, ne bis in idem, etc.), 
–  approximation of the facts and sanctions of crimes, 
–  legal approximation in criminal procedure, primarily by introducing the same 
standards in the fundamental rights context, 
– strengthening the obligation of EU-conform interpretation of criminal law rules. 
 
However, there is another path that I have to mention as part of this ‘bigger picture’. 
The efficient application of Community law and the necessary assurances safeguarding 
the functioning of the sui generis legal order required new principles and new methods of 
legal thinking. The evolution of Community law undoubtedly yielded fruit in criminal law 
as well, even if sometimes these fruits were bitter. This sense of bitterness further ensued 
on several occasions, when it became clear that in order to achieve the goals of European 
integration, even the (national) criminal law frameworks shall be triggered; moreover, that 
the supranational entity of the economic integration (first the Community then the Union) 
vindicates the right to be heard in matters of criminal law as well. As part of this 
movement the birth of new general principles is thus not rooted in criminal law, but in 
such matters that are in direct connection with economic integration. However, in the late 
‘90s a moment arrived when deepened integration set foot on the terrain of the criminal 
law and a general quest for legal basis was duly placed on the common agenda. The most 
important aspect of this development was how the traditional domestic criminal law 
horizon became broader and was enriched by new aspects flown from the legal reality of 
economic integration.  
The joint objective, as set out above, has not eroded since in the modus operandi of 
European policy-making: it always served as basis for next steps, for new ideas, for path-
seeking, and – of course – for the ‘invention’ of new sui generis legal institutions 
                                                           
16  European Court of Justice, judgement of 13 September 2005, case C-176/03. Commission v Council. 
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contributing to the evolution of ECL. It is important to see in this process, it is not 
substantial that during legislation, necessary political consultations have always smoothed 
the sharpness (and sometimes even the anachronism) of proposals and revolutionary ideas. 
The development has not stopped, only the steps remain smaller in nature in comparison 
to former proposals we have seen in this field. Still, the progress of development is 
undeniable. Its period is short: barely twenty-five years, but it was enough to arrive from a 
state of ‘nothing in common’ to present unification efforts and to the common policy of 
the AFSJ. It must be noted that “the trade-off for this evolution has been (as with the 
creation of monetary union) an opt-out for those Member States with misgivings about 
applying a supranational institutional framework to this area.”17 This ‘deal’, however, 
does not seem to overshadow revolutionary innovation but it is key in possibilities to 
develop the framework in such a radical way both at institutional and legislative levels.  
The development of ECL is similar to that of European integration: there was no clear 
vision of what the future will hold neither a layout nor blueprint with floor plans of the 
building that is the EU today. There were only seeds: common ideas for the Community to 
realize, which translates – in the context of criminal law – into the one very important 
common idea aimed at joint combat against crimes in Europe-wide perspective. This seed 
was sowed and with careful nourishment a tree was grown from it. The branches and 
canopy of this tree developed based on the common interests and common aims, but the 
specific measures and the subsequent steps were not always defined as clearly foreseeable 
parts of the big plan. However, the tree became stronger and stronger, its development 
was sometimes slow and not-linear, some branches have withered or broken, but the tree 
is still standing and growing18 – the idea of (legal and) economic integration is alive; it is 
the true reality for everybody in Europe.  
The same is valid for the development of the ECL; its organic growth is on-going, but 
the European achievements in the field of criminal law did not – yet – build up to form a 
comprehensive system contrary to that which is already established in Member States. 
This characteristic makes ECL for a colourful mosaic of legal norms and institutions, with 
the binding agent of everyone bringing something new, something ‘European’ (in the 
sense of not national) to the table, that changes the traditional features of domestic 
criminal law and legal thinking.  
 
 
 
IV. Area Independent Attributes of the European Criminal Policy 
 
In this section I don’t focus on the very important general and often discussed leading 
principles of European criminal policy as subsidiarity, proportionality, necessity and 
minimum ruling. I argue rather for the existence of additional inevitable attributes of 
criminal policy-making on European level independently from the area of criminal policy 
or of the true content of the legislation.  
                                                           
17  S. PEERS: EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Non-Civil). In: The Evolution of EU Law (ed: P. Craig, G. de 
Búrca). Oxford University Press. 2011. p. 269. 
18  I am indebted to Mr. JANOS BOKA for the tree allegory. 
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1. European Territoriality 
 
Traditionally criminal justice is ‘detained’ in the glass cell of sovereignty, it means that 
neither the exercising state power outside of the national territory nor the acceptance of 
foreign state power at the own territory are options for authorities in criminal matters not 
even for accelerating procedures or enhancing effectivity of investigations or judicial 
procedures. The integration within the EU has changed the landscape in this regard and 
introduced the concept of European territoriality also in criminal matters which is a 
leading principle of current and future legislative ideas on the EU level. The core of this 
concept is the integration idea, based on which the judicial systems of the different MS 
shall be viewed not as if they were systems of separate states independently of one 
another, but instead as if being made up of one common area. This means that the 
relationships and allocation of tasks among the single units within the system regulation 
would be governed based solely on regulation through jurisdictional competence, and not 
from the perspective of jurisdiction. Under the common European legal and jurisdictional 
area, cooperation would be based not on the jurisdiction of the foreign MS, but instead 
under the authority with jurisdiction and competence. Within this area, there would be no 
barriers to using evidence collected by such an authority, but there are also no limitations 
on taking procedural action for acts committed in the territory of another MS. The 
fundamental character of the principle is that the conflict of jurisdiction would be 
conceptually excluded, procedural resources can be allocated along both territorial 
competence- and jurisdictional regulation. Logically therefore, this goes together with 
jointly opening up the punitive demands of MS, that is, it means that the MS shall cease 
their independently articulated and represented prosecution claims. Of course, we are 
presently far from this, but the partial enforceability of European territoriality is ‘in the 
ballpark’ of achieving this with regard to certain crimes in is limited to investigation only. 
If however partial enforceability were to be implemented, then further ‘spill over’ could 
be expected, because multiple procedural systems operating in conjunction and in parallel 
would result in such discrepancies and discriminative procedures that their dissolution 
would require even further integration. Or, the development of a dual system similar to 
that in the US. The European principle of territoriality would also be capable of reducing 
the risk of forum shopping to a minimum. In the event of full acknowledgment of the 
principle, the theoretical and legal issues that arise from an authority of an MS in this 
capacity could initiate procedural (or operative) action in the territory of another MS and 
only according to specific regulation would diminish, because under a unified jurisdiction, 
representatives of public authority may undertake acts in connection with legal procedures 
according to identical regulation. 
 
 
2. Enhancing Mutual Trust 
 
Maintaining and enhancing mutual trust is crucial for European criminal policy, because 
this is the philosophical basis of the functional principle of mutual recognition and at the 
same time, the latter requires the former. Meanwhile, mutual recognition is the engine of 
cooperation in criminal matters between MS, mutual trust is the fuel.  
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Mutual trust means that the MS have mutual trust vested in one another’s criminal 
justice systems and that each of them recognizes the criminal law in force in the other MS, 
even if the outcome of a criminal procedure would be different if its own national law 
were to have been applied. The acknowledgement of mutual trust leaves no doubts on the 
proper functioning of another MS (criminal) justice system. It declares that if criminal law 
applies in a MS and its legal consequences or results shall be enforced or used in another 
MS, this ‘foreign’ link cannot be referenced solely as refusal of cooperation. Mutual trust 
is a political principle anchored in the TFEU without a norm-content, it serves and embeds 
for the legitimation of new legal tools and instruments on an EU-level and furthermore for 
judgements of Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). However, the recent development in 
connection with Article 7 of TEU19 challenges the mutual trust (see later in this paper).  
As we all know, mutual trust was simply assumed to be existent by the European 
Council of Cardiff, and equally presupposed by the Council of Tampere. In reality, this 
trust is still not spontaneously felt and is by no means always evident in practice, even if 
mutual confidence between MS judicial and prosecution authorities appears to be 
growing.20 It is important to note that MS are willing to articulate in concrete cases that 
there is no trust and there is nothing mutual; but on European level – on criminal policy 
level – the general withdrawal from mutual trust is indefensible. Maintaining mutual trust 
also means the acknowledgement of a certain common responsibility for the proper 
functioning criminal justice systems within the EU – “by entering into a system of closer 
cooperation in criminal matters (…), they not only share the benefit of more efficient 
criminal law enforcement, but they also more closely share the burden of maintaining the 
rule of law and protecting the human rights of citizens throughout the Union. If anywhere 
within the Union human rights are endangered, no Judicial Authority of a requested state 
can wash his hands in innocence.”21  
 
 
3. EU Functionality  
 
In this paper, functionality will be applied for identifying legal concepts which can be 
labelled as tools of a “better functioning EU” and which transform the EU from an 
independent (supranational) institution to an actor capable of representing its own interests 
and of taking action for them. I would like to mention two important concepts: criminal 
                                                           
19  Article 7 TEU aims at ensuring that all EU countries respect the common values of the EU, including the rule of 
law. The preventive mechanism of Article 7(1) TEU can be activated only in case of a ’clear risk of a serious 
breach’ and the sanctioning mechanism of Article 7(2) TEU only in case of a ’serious and persistent breach by a 
Member State’ of the values set out in Article 2. The preventive mechanism allows the Council to give the EU 
country concerned a warning before a ’serious breach’ has actually materialised. The sanctioning mechanism 
allows the Council to suspend certain rights deriving from the application of the treaties to the EU country in 
question, including the voting rights of that country in the Council. In that case the ’serious breach’ must have 
persisted for some time. 
20  See more in G. VERNIMMEN, V. TIGGELEN, L. SURANO: Analysis of the future of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters in the European Union. 2008.  
21  N. KEIJZER: The European Arrest Warrant and Human Rights. Current Issues in European Law and the 
Protection of Financial Interests. Dubrovnik, 13–14 May 2005. Asser Institute. www.asser.nl 
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law can be deployed for ensuring European policies on one hand, and on the other hand, 
for the extension of the primacy (supremacy) of EU law.  
Article 83, 2 TFEU contains a rule fixing the broad concept of Community 
competences initially originating from judicial interpretation22 attributing them 
constitutional effect. According to Article 83 paragraph 2 MS criminal law can be invoked 
to enforce EU policies: “if the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the 
Member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy 
in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures, directives may establish 
minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area 
concerned. Such directives shall be adopted by the same ordinary or special legislative 
procedure as was followed for the adoption of the harmonisation measures in question, 
without prejudice to Article 76.” 
This provision means an important commitment on one hand in the interest of the 
functioning of the EU and realization of its policies, and on the other hand, it also 
demonstrates the cooperation where member states criminal law may also serve as tools for 
assuring EU functions. It must also not be forgotten that many criminal policy issues 
currently falling under the area of AFSJ first arose as direct and indirect consequences of 
establishing a common market. As such for example, protection against counterfeiting of the 
Euro arose upon its introduction, and is in connection with the transnational ne bis in idem 
and problems of legal authorities, and in relation to the freedom of movement. Therefore, the 
two components of EU criminal policy serve the functionality of the EU – somewhat 
similarly to national criminal policy principles provided by the state’s criminal law.  
CJEU had to decide in the last 30-40 years in cases where the primary Community law 
had to be applied directly in criminal procedures, while also defining elements of offences 
or providing lawfulness for certain ‘common market relevant’ behaviours. The jurisdiction 
of the CJEU follows a clear path with clear limits: case law in criminal matters cannot fill 
gaps of punishability, Community law (union law) cannot extend or establish criminal 
responsibility if the (written) domestic law does not provide a solid basis for it. With 
gaining ius puniendi on an EU level, it must be added that diverging development occurs 
in the future, but CJEU still sticks on this doctrine. Especially in Taricco I23 we could 
observe how important EU functionality was, but in Taricco II24 we witnessed its 
restriction, which led back to the limits-doctrine.25 
In Taricco I namely, the CJEU stated that “a national rule in relation to limitation 
periods for criminal offences (…) — which provided, at the material time in the main 
proceedings, that the interruption of criminal proceedings concerning serious fraud in 
relation to value added tax had the effect of extending the limitation period by only a 
quarter of its initial duration — is liable to have an adverse effect on fulfilment of the 
Member States’ obligations under Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU if that national rule 
prevents the imposition of effective and dissuasive penalties in a significant number of 
cases of serious fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union, or provides 
                                                           
22  Commission v Council, cit. 
23  Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement of 8 September 2015, case C‑105/14, Ivo Taricco and others.  
24  Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement of 5 December 2017, case C‑42/17,  M.A.S., M.B.  
25  K. KARSAI: The legality of criminal law and the new competences of the TFEU. In Zeitschrift für International 
Strafrechtsdogmatik. 2016. pp. 24–39. 
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for longer limitation periods in respect of cases of fraud affecting the financial interests of 
the Member State concerned than in respect of those affecting the financial interests of the 
European Union, which it is for the national court to verify. The national court must give 
full effect to Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU, if need be by disapplying the provisions of 
national law the effect of which would be to prevent the Member State concerned from 
fulfilling its obligations under Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU.” This ruling triggered very 
intensive academic debates, because it argued for EU law primacy (which belongs to the 
functionalist concept of EU law) against the principle of legality: this judgement says that 
the interests of the EU to protect its financial interest with effective, proportionate and 
deterrent sanctions overrules the prohibition of retroactive application of detrimental 
criminal law provisions (in connection with the statute of limitation). Certain national 
provisions shall not be applied, which would result in the consequence of penalties 
possibly not being imposed on persons who would have been imposed on, had those 
provisions been applied. This means that the conditions of criminal liability were stricter 
than those in force at the time the offence was perpetrated.26  
But this decision went too far27 – the legality principle is still a strong limit for 
extending criminal responsibility even on the detriment of EU functionality.  
The CJEU reconsidered itself in Taricco II and established two exemptions from the 
original Taricco-statement: “Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU must be interpreted as requiring 
the national court, in criminal proceedings for infringements relating to value added tax, to 
disapply national provisions on limitation, forming part of national substantive law, which 
prevent the application of effective and deterrent criminal penalties in a significant 
number of cases of serious fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU, or which lay 
down shorter limitation periods for cases of serious fraud affecting those interests than for 
those affecting the financial interests of the MS concerned, unless that disapplication 
entails a breach of the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law 
because of the lack of precision of the applicable law or because of the retroactive 
application of legislation imposing conditions of criminal liability stricter than those in 
force at the time the infringement was committed.” 
 
 
4. Human Rights  
 
The Charter did not create new fundamental rights nor did it extend the scope of the 
already achieved protection by the Union law, it mirrors rather the state of art in this regard, 
but indeed its obligatory character opened a new horizon for enforcing fundamental rights 
within EU law – according to its original function correctly. On one hand, the EU 
                                                           
26  See more e.g. M. KRAJEWSKI: Conditional primacy of EU law and its deliberative value an imperfect illustration 
from Taricco II. 2017.  http://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/12/18/conditional-primacy-of-eu-law-and-its-deliberative-
value-an-imperfect-illustration-from-taricco-ii/ 
27  The Italian Constitutional Court asked for preliminary ruling by the CJEU as well: according to the Constitutional 
Court, the application of the “Taricco rule” in the Italian legal system would violate Articles 25(2) and 101(2) of 
the Constitution and could not, therefore, be allowed, even in light of the principle of supremacy of Union law. 
However, in the Constitutional Court’s view, Taricco I appeared to exclude such an application in cases where a 
conflict with the constitutional identity of the Member State would arise, entailing a violation of the principle of 
legality in criminal law.  
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institutions shall follow and obey human rights as enshrined in the Charter while 
exercising their competences, and Member States are also addressees “only when they are 
implementing Union law”28 on the other hand. As the fifth preamble section underlines: 
“his Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Community and the 
Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the 
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the 
Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by 
the Community and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights.” 
Any European criminal policy shall apply the achievements of human rights 
protection, in particular with regard to the very specific criminal justice implications (ne 
bis in idem, legality, fair trial, presumption of innocence, guilt, protection of life, 
prohibition of torture and inhuman, degrading treatment etc.).   
 
 
 
V. Challenges of European Criminal Policy 
 
 
1. Uncertainties of the European Territoriality  
 
The real procedural law test of European territoriality will be the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, in terms of criminal cases.  
The efforts to combat transnational- and cross-border crime had brought the area based 
on freedom security, and justice to life in the first place (obviously, starting based on its 
history), and that the joint efforts of the MS would provide sufficient and effective solutions 
to modern forms of crime. The result of the joint efforts was that criminal prosecution and 
criminal justice operating under the national framework has opened, and many such 
achievements have come to life that have raised the national instruments of the judiciary for 
exercising power to a supranational European- or cooperative level between MS.  
Whereas EPPO follows the European territoriality principle within the MS of the 
enhanced cooperation, the same regime would reactivate ‘state borders’ in its cooperation 
with non-participating MS inflating the achievements in area of freedom, security and 
justice.  I believe that the external effects of this so-called enhanced cooperation will be 
significant, necessary, and inevitable – and the conflicts emerging because of these will 
presumably only be solvable if all MS enter the EPPO system.  
Any system allowing the opting out of certain geographic territories from the unified 
territorial competence and allowing for independent decisions to be passed in a proceeding 
with the case by authorities independent from each other, creates a fundamental ‘hotbed’ of 
                                                           
28  Article 50, 1: „The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing 
Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in 
accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in 
the Treaties.” 
KRISZTINA KARSAI 
   
 
76 
forum shopping resulting from the collision of jurisdictions: it applies both for the 
prosecutors of crime and the criminals. In addition, there can be another layer can further 
aggravate such a situation: when there are also political reasons behind opting out of EPPO.  
 
 
2. Challenges for Mutual Trust  
 
The principle of mutual trust (political) prevails well for the most part in a significant part 
of the cases, this way it provides the functionality of legal instruments based on mutual 
recognition. However, in some concrete cases, it demonstrates significant deficit and can 
even jeopardize cooperation between member states. 
Concrete cases of doubting mutual trust may well be colourful, and a MS can be both a 
‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ of this mistrustful state’s behaviour. Hungarian criminal justice 
was for instance ‘victim’ of mistrust exercised by Irish authorities in the Ciaran Tobin 
extradition case29, but is a true ‘perpetrator’ in case of the chief manager of the Hungarian 
national oil company, who is charged with severe corruption allegations by Croatian 
authorities and sought by European arrest warrant. This person was not surrendered to 
Croatia despite a lawfully issued and enforceable arrest warrant; and moreover, the 
surrender obligation was creatively circumvented by a parallel Hungarian criminal 
procedure. For now, the case is still open, because the CJEU decided in a preliminary 
ruling procedure on this ‘second’ Hungarian criminal procedure30 with a consequence that 
it has no effect on the surrender request, according to EU law, Hungary should surrender 
the concerned person to Croatia. I don’t think that such individual cases can truly violate or 
inflate the mutual trust generally, but indeed they make dark shadows on the expectation of 
citizens towards authorities to carry out fair cooperation in criminal matters.  
In this regard, the more disturbing phenomenon which has serious potential to harm 
mutual trust is that if the legal system (within criminal justice) as such will be questioned 
or at least institutional doubts will be formulated against a MS. In the case of Poland31 and 
Hungary32, that is the situation recently (based on the Article 7 TEU) and so the risk is 
                                                           
29  P. BÁRD:  bűnügyi együttműködés csapdái: a Tobin-ügy. [The Traps of Criminal Cooperation: the Tobin case.] In: 
Kriminológiai tanulmányok. 2014. pp. 93–108. http://www.okri.hu/images/stories/KT/kt51_2014_sec.pdf 
30  Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement of 25 July 2018, case C‑268/17, European arrest warrant 
against AZ. 
31  “Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in Poland. European Commission - 
Press release. Brussels, 20 December 2017. „Despite repeated efforts, for almost two years, to engage the Polish 
authorities in a constructive dialogue in the context of the Rule of Law Framework, the Commission has today 
concluded that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law in Poland. The Commission is therefore 
proposing to the Council to adopt a decision under Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union. The European 
Commission is taking action to protect the rule of law in Europe. Judicial reforms in Poland mean that the 
country's judiciary is now under the political control of the ruling majority. In the absence of judicial 
independence, serious questions are raised about the effective application of EU law, from the protection of 
investments to the mutual recognition of decisions in areas as diverse as child custody disputes or the execution of 
European Arrest Warrants.” 
32  “Rule of law in Hungary: Parliament calls on the EU to act. European Parliament - Press Release, 12 September 
2018. EP sees a clear risk of a serious breach of the EU founding values in Hungary Judicial independence, 
freedom of expression, corruption, rights of minorities, and the situation of migrants and refugees are key concerns 
Council may address recommendations to Hungary to counter the threat Parliament has asked EU member states 
to determine, in accordance with Treaty Article 7, whether Hungary is at risk of breaching the EU´s founding 
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increasing that national courts in other MS which had to decide on requests of judicial 
authorities from these two countries for any form of cooperation in criminal matters will 
mistrust the countries and so deny the cooperation. That is a real danger. That was the 
opinion of the Irish High Court as well through requesting a preliminary ruling33 in a 
European arrest warrant case against a Polish citizen.34 
The CJEU stated in its milestone decision35 that the judiciary has an important role on 
serving rule of law: “the executing judicial authority, called upon to decide whether a 
person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been issued has material (…) 
indicating that there is a real risk of breach of the fundamental right to a fair trial (…) on 
account of systemic or generalised deficiencies so far as concerns the independence of the 
issuing Member State’s judiciary, that authority must determine, specifically and 
precisely, whether, having regard to his personal situation, as well as to the nature of the 
offence for which he is being prosecuted and the factual context that form the basis of the 
European arrest warrant, and in the light of the information provided by the issuing 
Member State (…) there are substantial grounds for believing that that person will run 
such a risk if he is surrendered to that State.” 
The usage of Article 7 poses the consequence that mutual trust as a political 
declaration became the subject of political concerns. CJEU added a certain legal content 
to the political declaration of mutual trust and made “judges monitoring the judges”36 – 
this decision makes judges obliged to be aware of rule of law and fundamental rights 
implications through adjudication, and they have to read ‘between the lines’ based on the 
information provided by the requesting judicial authorities.  
 
 
3. EU-Functionality v National Legal Traditions 
 
Having an independent EU policy based on freedom, security and the enforcement of law 
makes the survival of national legal traditions an especially important question (namely in 
the scope of criminal justice), and the question of adhering to the tradition, especially when 
the legal institutions deriving from these is fundamentally different from that of another 
                                                           
values. The request was approved by 448 votes to 197, with 48 abstentions. To be adopted, the proposal required 
an absolute majority of members (376) and two thirds of the votes cast - excluding the abstentions. This is the first 
time that Parliament has called on the Council of the EU to act against a member state to prevent a systemic threat 
to the Union’s founding values. These values, which are enshrined in EU Treaty Article 2 and reflected in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, include respect for democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights. MEPs 
called on EU countries to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 7(1) the EU Treaty, noting that despite the 
Hungarian authorities’ readiness to discuss the legality of any specific measure, they have not addressed the 
situation, “and many concerns remain”. They stress that this is the preventive phase of the procedure, providing for 
a dialogue with the country concerned, and that it is “intended to avoid possible sanctions”. 
33  http://www.courts.ie/  Minister for Justice and Equality -v- Celmer (No.1) [2018] IEHC 119; 12. March 2018.  
34  P. BÁRD, W. VAN BALLEGOOIJ: Judicial Independence as a Precondition for Mutual Trust, in VerfBlog, 
2018/4/10, https://verfassungsblog.de/judicial-independence-as-a-precondition-for-mutual-trust/ 
35  Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement of 25 July 2018, case C‑216/18 PPU, European arrest 
warrants issued against LM. 
36  T. T. KONCEWICZ: The Consensus Fights Back: European First Principles Against the Rule of Law Crisis (part 1). 
VerfBlog, 2018/4/05, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-consensus-fights-back-european-first-principles-against-
the-rule-of-law-crisis-part-1 
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member state or from those determined supranationally. It is important to note however, 
that currently, European criminal policy has not made the unification of laws a top priority, 
but nonetheless it is obvious that the most effective form of the approximation of laws is by 
all means unification. By enforcing European arrest warrants (EAW) became clear that 
‘convictions in absentia’ and the possibility of ensuing right to a retrial could be a subject of 
doubt and could be a real obstacle of EAW’ functioning due to different national laws. In 
order to eliminate national diversity and to facilitate mutual cooperation and recognition in 
criminal matters, the modification of the framework decision was necessary in 2009.  
Raising minimum regulation to the rank of the basic treaty is in itself a type of 
unification, and as such is of fundamental importance in integration, in this area, the 
differences among member states cannot be referred to. The criminal law traditions of 
different member states can be relevant in unique cases, where during legislation, the 
emergency break procedure occurs, but in order to prevent this, the minimum regulation 
techniques can be used very creatively and should be applied.  
 
 
4. Human Rights and Functionality 
 
The question is more complex when different legal institutions based on member state 
traditions plays a direct and unique role for the protection of a fundamental rights, because 
in such a case the member state protection pertaining to the individual (accused, victim, 
witness) appears to be ‘stronger’ and ‘firmer’, and in concrete cases serious doubt can 
arise against the application of the EU norm. An even more difficult question is if the legal 
institution of the given member state is that part of its constitutional identity37 that can be 
said to be the most important building blocks of criminal justice. Constitutional (national) 
identity can be pulled forth at any time with regard to questions of criminal justice, a 
‘trump’ card that in theory can be capable of causing distress in the legislative process. 
However, for the time being, all we see is that this distress is brought about and 
strengthened by the application of law, so that it can in turn resolve it: the Melloni case 
(2013), the Fransson case (2013), the Taricco case (2015) and the afterlife of these plot 
out the difficulties and concrete problems well regarding the practice of European criminal 
policy (namely joint EU legislation). The German Federal Constitutional Court submitted 
its vote regarding this question – in a German constitutional complaint case about a 
European arrest warrant, without consulting the CJEU in the question of interpretation of 
EU law (!) – and specified national constitutional identity as a strict limitation in this 
scope: “the Federal Constitutional Court, by means of the identity review, guarantees 
without reservations and in every individual case the protection of fundamental rights 
indispensable (…). The strict requirements for activating the identity review are paralleled 
by stricter admissibility requirements for constitutional complaints that raise such an issue. 
The principle of individual guilt is part of the constitutional identity. It must therefore be 
                                                           
37  Article 4, 2 TEU: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and 
local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of 
the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the 
sole responsibility of each Member State.” 
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ensured that it is complied with in extraditions for the purpose of executing sentences that 
were rendered in the absence of the requested person during the trial. German public 
authority must not assist other states in violating human dignity. The extent and the scope 
of the investigations, which German courts must conduct in order to ensure the respect of 
the principle of individual guilt, depend on the nature and the significance of the points 
submitted by the requested person that indicate that the proceedings in the requesting state 
fall below the minimum standards required by Art. 1 sec. 1 GG.”38 
The question of whether EU (law) functionality can interfere with human rights will not 
appear in policymaking or in legislation on criminal justice, because subsidiarity and 
proportionality must be accurately tested and therefore, the need also arises EU level 
instruments to be justified in pieces of legislation as inevitable requirements in the 
legislative process. Meanwhile in the application of law, the picture is much more different.  
Human rights protection belongs to the competences and duties of the states through 
national constitutions, national courts, and legal order. The development triggered by the 
European Human Rights Convention and by the smart jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has led to a certain level of protection in every MS 
guaranteed by their constitution and legal order, enforced by their courts.  
The ‘old’ role of the CJEU in human rights protection shall not be underestimated 
(before the Charter), in many cases it decided in favour of better protection based on the 
human rights standards developed by ECtHR and derived from general principles of 
Community law.39 But those efforts had entirely different character and consequences 
than that under current law. CJEU has to apply and enforce the Charter, therefore the 
human rights protection became an important function and competence of the CJEU 
parallelly with the protection of union law. In the milestone cases of the last five years, we 
saw the CJEU’s steps to ease the tension between lower protection provided by supreme 
union law and more protective national norms, because national courts (also constitutional 
or high courts) were requesting the CJEU to observe this tension (see above ‘Taricco II’).  
 
 
 
VI. Expanding Criminalisation? No.  
 
The EU receives serious criticism for its criminal policy, expressing that over the past 
twenty years, the EU has been exercising its criminalisation powers very actively. It is a 
question of fact that with the establishment of the third pillar, but especially following the 
amendment of the Treaty of Amsterdam, EU-level legislation that would affect criminal 
law systems began. 
This was fundamentally different from criminal law norms appearing in traditional 
conventions of international public law regarding legal characteristics, legislative process, 
and implementation. 
The content of the norms was determined based on which area and for what purpose 
the prevailing basic treaty would allow for the EU to bring legislation.  In this regard, it 
                                                           
38  Order of 15 December 2015 2 BvR 2735/14. http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20151215_2bvr273514en.html 
39  G. DE BÚRCA: The Evolution of EU Human Rights Law. In: The Evolution of EU Law. (eds.: P. Craig, G. de 
Búrca). Oxford University Press. 2011. pp. 465–498. 
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cannot be ignored that basically the TEU created the competence for approximation 
regarding crime (and sanctions), which means that punishment itself and punishments 
with reasonable boundaries could be the task of the EU. That is, within the scope of 
punishment, it shall only determine which are the behaviours that shall definitely be 
punished, because their subjective weight is so extreme, and thus it is of key importance 
that they be appropriately sanctioned in all member states. And with regard to the 
punishment, the expression of this judgment must be present – determining minimum 
sanctions for crimes that are to be punished in all cases.   
Logically, criminalization is dominant, as on one hand, these norms without community 
law history qualify some act punishable, so in legal terms they criminalize but in reality, the 
dominant judgment in the member state is raised to EU-level. During this course, it can be 
possible that in some member state, some act in question had not been qualified as a crime, 
but considering the areas of legislation it can be said that these are adequate corrections 
from the viewpoint of effective protection of joint values. The joint criminal policy has not 
yet reached the point where decriminalization expressly appears somewhere, in an EU 
norm that affects some criminal law subsystem, but for the time being, this is not yet 
necessary. Namely, the effect of decriminalization is triggered by European law itself 
through EU policies infiltrated in areas of European law by primacy and its direct effect, as 
well as by the prevailing legal guarantee of the four freedoms of the common market. It is 
unnecessary for example, to state that the cultivation of industrial hemp is not drug 
cultivation or smuggling cannot be committed of goods arriving from EU member states, 
etc., but we also do not need to separately record that an abortion performed by a doctor 
legally or a brothel operated legally cannot be a crime in another member state. These, and 
similar acts, as such cannot be subject to criminal prosecution if the national law would 
possibly require this, because EU law indirectly causes the decriminalization.   
Based on the above, it is my opinion that criticism concerning the expansion of 
criminalization should be rejected. 
 
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
In this study, I summarized the short development of European criminal policy and its 
main, generally considered to be valid criteria. My aim is for us to understand the 
characteristics and speciality of European criminal policy, in contrast to our national 
criminal policy, primarily of course, the differences, because these are the novelties that 
that can free criminal policy from the agenda and aims of actual- and party politics. By 
this, they serve as assurance that criminal policy always be active based on a professional 
basis, as an effective tool for realistic aims, Europe-wide control of crime. 
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KARSAI KRISZTINA 
 
EURÓPAI KRIMINÁLPOLITIKA 
 
(Összefoglalás) 
 
 
Az európai kriminálpolitika létezése és főbb jellemzőinek megállapítása, valamint 
analitikus bemutatása a jelen tanulmány célja. Az európai kriminálpolitika – ami 
jelentősen különbözik és markánsan elkülönül a tagállami kriminálpolitikáktól – legfőbb 
jellemzője az, hogy nem érzékeny a tagállami pártpolitikai befolyásokra, míg ezzel 
szemben a kriminálpolitika a hagyományos nemzeti keretrendszerben értelmezve nem 
létezik és alighanem nem is létezhet enélkül. A szerző bemutatja az európai 
kriminálpolitika rövid előtörténetét, megszületésének körülményeit, jelenlegi aktorait és a 
fent említetten kívüli főbb attribútumait, amelyek az európai területiség elvéből, a 
kölcsönös bizalomból, az uniós jog funkcionalitásából és az emebri jogok uniós 
védelméből építkeznek. A tanulmány kitér arra is, hogy e fő jellemzőket a jelenlegi uniós 
közpolitikai és jogalkotási tendenciákban milyen hatások érik, valamint a szerző 
megfogalmazza az elemzésein alapuló prognózisait az európai kriminálpolitika jövőjét 
illetően is.  
